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Zeff et al.: Summaries: Constitutional Law

NINTH CIRCUIT SURVEY
SUMMARIES
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
NINTH CIRCUIT UPHOLDS CONSTITUTIONALITY OF
FEDERAL MAGISTRATE ACT OF 1979

I.

INTRODUCTION

In Pacemaker Diagnostic Clinic of America v. Instromedix,
Inc.,1 the Ninth Circuit upheld the constitutionality of Section
636(c) of the Federal Magistrate Act of 1979. 2
1. 725 F.2d 537 (9th Cir. 1984) (per Kennedy, en bane consideration; Schroeder,
with whom Pregerson and Canby join, dissenting), eert. denied, 53 U.S.L.W. 3236 (1984).
2. The Federal Magistrate Act of 1979, 28 U.S.C. §636(c) (1979), as added by Act of
October 10, 1979, Pub. L. 96-82, § 2, 93 Stat. 643. Section 636(c) of the Federal Magistrate Act of 1979 was added to amend the current jurisdictional provisions for U.S. magistrates in order to further clarify and expand the jurisdiction of U.S. magistrates and
improve access to the federal courts for the less advantaged. Under this new section,
magistrates have the authority to conduct civil trials and enter final judgment upon the
consent of the parties. Section 636(c) (1), which was provided by the Act of October 10,
1979, provides:
(c) Notwithstanding any provision of law to the contrary(1) Upon consent of the parties, a full-time United States
magistrate or a part-time United States magistrate who serves
as a full-time judicial officer may conduct any or all proceedings in a jury or non-jury civil matter and order the entry of
judgment in the case, when specially designated to exercise
such jurisdiction by the district court or courts he serves.
Upon the consent of the parties, pursuant to their specific
written request, any other part-time magistrate may exercise
such jurisdiction, if such magistrate meets the bar membership requirements set forth in section 631(b) (1) and the chief
judge of the district court certifies that a full-time magistrate
is not reasonably available in accordance with the guidelines
established by the judicial council of the circuit. When there is
more than one judge of a district court, designation under this
paragraph shall be by the concurrence of a majority of all the
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Pacemaker instituted an action for patent infringement
against Instromedix, and Instromedix counterclaimed for a declaration of the patent's invalidity. The parties consented to have
the case tried before a U.S. magistrate, pursuant to the local
rules of Oregon and 28 U.S.C. §636(c).
The magistrate held the patent valid, but not infringed.
Both parties appealed, and a panel of the Ninth Circuit, sua
sponte, raised the issue of the constitutionality of trial by a
magistrate. The panel held the statute invalid and vacated the
judgment. 3 Subsequently, an order was issued granting a rehearing en bane:'
II.

THE COURT'S ANALYSIS

A. The Majority
The Ninth Circuit granted a rehearing to determine the
constitutionality of Section 636(c), and found it constitutional
on two grounds. First, the court found that although the statute
gave the appearance of granting article III authority to non-article III judges, the ultimate control remained at all times with
article III judges. G Additionally, the freely and voluntarily given
consent of the parties to magistrates' jurisdiction cured any constitutional defects in the section. 8
The Ninth Circuit concluded that the proper standard to
determine whether there was an improper interference or delegation of the independent power of a branch of the federal government is whether the alteration prevents or substantially impairs performance by the branch of its essential role in the
constitutional system. 7 The general rule is that if the essential
constitutional role of the judiciary is to be maintained, there
must be both the appearance and the reality of control by article
III judges over the interpretation, declaration and application of
federal law. s

3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.

judges of such district court, and when there is no such concurrence, then by the chief judge.
Pacemaker Diagnostic Clinic v. Instromedix, Inc., 712 F.2d 1305 (9th Cir. 1983).
Pacemaker Diagnostic Clinic v. Instromedix, Inc., 718 F.2d 971 (9th Cir. 1983).
Pacemaker, 725 F.2d at 544-46.
[d. at 542-43.
[d. at 544.
[d. See Northern Pipeline Construction Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S.
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In Pacemaker,9 the Ninth Circuit held that the control of
article III judges over magistrates under 28 U.S.C. §636(c) contained sufficient protections against the erosion of judicial power
to overcome the constitutional objections leveled against it.IO
Furthermore, the Ninth Circuit found that the statute invests
the article III judiciary with extensive administrative control
over the management, composition and operation of the entire
magistrate system. Magistrates are appointed by district
judges,ll and subject to removal by them.12 In addition, district
judges retain plenary authority over when, what and how many
pretrial matters are assigned to magistrates. 13
The court continued its constitutional analysis of Section
636(c) stating that, if the section contained mandatory provisions for trial of an unrestricted class of civil cases by a magistrate and not by an article III judge, it would be unconstitutional. 14 However, the court also stated that the right to trial by
an article III judge may be waived with the informed and volun50, 58-60 (1982); United States v. Raddatz, 447 U.S. 667, 685 (1982).
9. The Ninth Circuit began its analysis of the control of article III judges over U.S.
magistrates by declaring the historical significance of the attributes of article III judges:
"The attributes of Article III judges, permanency in office and the right to an undiminished compensation, are as essential to the independence of the judiciary now as they
were when the Constitution was framed." 725 F.2d at 541. See THE FEDERALIST Nos. 78
and 79 (A. Hamilton); Northern Pipeline, 458 U.S. at 58-60; United States v. Will, 449
U.S. 200, 217-21 (1980). The court further declared that the significance of these attributes, which were set forth to guarantee a separate and independent judiciary, "are present constitutional necessities, not relics of antique ideas." 725 F.2d at 541.
10. [d. In Raddatz, 447 U.S. at 667, the court emphasized that delegation to a nonarticle III judicial officer is permissible as long as the ultimate decision is made by the
district court. In Wharton-Thomas v. United States, 721 F.2d 922 (3rd Cir. 1983), a case
decided just before Pacemaker, the Third Circuit held that 28 U.S.C. §636(c) did not
violate the Constitution for four reasons, all of which were included in the Ninth Circuit's reasoning. The four reasons are: (1) the reference to a magistrate is consensual; (2)
the district judge has the power to vacate the reference; (3) the magistrate is appointed
by the district judge, is a part of the district court, and is specially designated to try
cases; and (4) the parties have a right of appeal to a district judge or the court of appeals. 721 F.2d at 930.
11. 28 U.S.C. §631.
12. [d.
13. Article III authority is also preserved in other respects. District courts retain the'
power to adjudge a party in contempt. 28 U.S.C. §636(e). Sections 636(c) (3) and (4)
provide for appellate review of the judgment of the magistrate by the appropriate court
of appeals as a matter of right or, if the parties consent, by the district court. 28 U.S.C.
§§636(c) (3), (4). Article III courts retain full authority over questions of law.
14. 725 F.2d at 541.
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tarily given consent of the parties. III
In Wharton-Thomas v. United States, the Third Circuit
concluded that consent of all parties under Section 636(c) cures
any constitutional defects. 16 The Ninth Circuit adopted the
Wharton- Thomas decision, noting that the Supreme Court has
allowed criminal defendants to waive even fundamental rights. 17
The court pointed to these cases to support its conclusion that
parties may waive personal rights to have cases heard by an article III judge as long as the waiver is freely and voluntarily
obtained.
The Ninth Circuit offered several justifications for its conclusions regarding the importance of consent to magistrates' jurisdiction. First, the court pointed out that in Northern Pipeline
Construction Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line CO./8 the Supreme
Court's most recent interpretation of Article III, all the justices
indicated that consent is important to the constitutional analysis. IS The Ninth Circuit also gave considerable weight to the
judgment that Congress has stated that consent of the parties
eliminates constitutional objections. 20 Congress added Section
636(c) (2) in its 1979 Amendment to the Act in recognition of
15.Id.
16. 721 F.2d at 925-26.
17. 725 F.2d at 543. Garner v. United States, 424 U.S. 648 (1976) (right to be free
from self-incrimination); Adams v. United States ex rei. McCann, 317 U.S. 269 (1942)
(right to counsel); Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218 (1973) (right to be free from
unreasonable searches and seizures); Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514 (1972) (right to a
speedy trial); Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968) (right to a jury trial); Boykin v.
Alabama, 395 U.S. 243 (1968) (right to trial itself and guilty pleas).
18. See supra note 8.
19. 725 F.2d at 542.
20. Id. at 542. The Senate Report to the Federal Magistrate Act of 1979 gave explicit consideration to the importance of the consent of the parties, and states in part:
This bill makes it clear that the voluntary consent of the parties is required before any civil action may be referred to a
magistrate. In light of this requirement of consent, no witness
at the hearings on the bill found any constitutional question
that could be raised against the provision. Near unanimity existed among the witnesses on the overall constitutionality of
the bill. . . This bill clearly requires the voluntary consent of
the parties as a prerequisite to a magistrate's exercise of the
new jurisdiction. The committee firmly believes that no pressue, tacit or expressed, should be applied to the litigants to
induce them to consent to trial before the magistrates.
S. REP. No. 74, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 1, reprinted in 1979 U.S. CODE CONGo & An. NEWS
1469, 1473.
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the importance of consent. 21
Finally, the Ninth Circuit found that consent to magistrates' jurisdiction would not be acceptable if the alternative to
trial by magistrate were the imposition of serious burdens and
costs on the litigant. 22 The court maintained that if it were
shown that the choice was between trial before a magistrate or
the endurance of delay or other measurable hardships not justified by the needs of judicial administration, then there would be
a question as to whether any consent given was truly voluntary.
However, the court found that no such burdens or hardships
were demonstrated. The court further found that access to district judges is not so restricted that adjudication of cases by
magistrates is a compelled alternative. 23
In the last portion of its analysis, the Ninth Circuit dismissed the argument that in the federal system a party may not
consent to jurisdiction, so that the parties may not waive their
rights under article III. The court rejected this argument because it is only applicable where the parties attempt to confer
upon an article III court a subject matter that Congress or the
Constitution forbids. 2 ' Patent law, the subject matter of the
Pacemaker case, is exclusively one of federal law. The Supreme
Court has explicitly held that Congress may confer upon federal
courts jurisdiction conditioned upon a defendant's consent. 211
Thus, the Ninth Circuit concluded that Section 636(c) does not
expand article III jurisdiction but allows the transfer to another
federal forum, comparing the consent to magistrates' jurisdiction
to waiver of a defect in jurisdiction over the person, a waiver
21. Section 636(c) (2), which was added by the Act of October 10, 1979, Pub. L. 9682, §2, 92 Stat. 643, provides:
If a magistrate is designated to exercise civil jurisdiction under
paragraph (1) of this subsection ... the decision of the parties shall be communicated to the clerk of the court. Thereafter, neither the district judge nor the magistrate shall attempt
to persuade or induce any party to consent to reference of any
civil matter to a magistrate. Rules of court for the reference of
civil matters to magistrates shall include procedures to protect
the voluntariness of the parties' consent.
22. 725 F.2d at 543.
23.Id.
24.Id.
25. Williams v. Austrian, 331 U.S. 642, 652 (1947); and Harris v. Avery Brundage
Co., 305 U.S. 160 (1938).
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federal courts permit. 28
B.

The Dissent

In a sharply-worded dissent, Judge Schroeder contended
that the majority based its holding on three fundamentally misguided assumptions: that the exercise of judicial power can depend upon stipulations of the litigants; that magistrates who operate under the thumbs of district court judges have the
independence the Constitution is designed to ensure; and that
consent to use of a magistrate can be presumed to be voluntary
when the explicit purpose of the consensual provision of the
Magistrate Act was to encourage certain classes of litigants to
abandon their right to article III adjudication. 27 The dissent argued that the Magistrate Act, and Section 636(c) in particular,
create mutations in our system of government that transend its
impact on individual litigants. The dissent was particularly concerned that Section 636(c) would herald the loss of the independent exercise of judicial power, the principal check on encroachment by the legislative and executive branches, and also
. legislative and executive checks on incursions by the judiciary.28
The dissent also contended that the independence of the judiciary is threatened even where district court judges maintain
the appearance and reality of control over civil cases handled by
magistrates because of the dangerous implications of judges having control over other judges. This structure creates the potential for conflicts of interest for magistrates who must choose be26. Hoffman v. Blaski, 363 U.S. 335, 343 (1960).
27. 725 F.2d at 547.
The first assumption is that under our constitutional system
the exercise of the judicial power of the United States by article III judges can depend upon stipulations of the litigants.
The second is that magistrates, who operate under the thumb
of the district court judges and whose salaries are not pro- .
tected from retaliatory diminution by Congress. have the independence the Constitution is designed to ensure. The third ia
that consent to use of a magistrate can be presumed to be voluntary when the explicit purpose of the consensual reference
provision of the Magistrates Act was to encourage certain classes of litigants to abandon their right to article III adjudication because existing overburdened district judges could not
hear all cases promptly.
1d.

28. 725 F.2d at 549.
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tween what they conclude is right and the result they feel will
please the district court. In this regard, Judge Schroeder maintained that under our Constitution no judge should be accountable to any other judge and that in reality, the control of district
judges over magistrates prevents the independence of decision
making. 29
Finally, Judge Schroeder contended that the freely and voluntarily given consent of the parties was merely the "illusion of
voluntary consent. "30 The dissent pointed out that the Federal
Magistrate Act was perceived by Congress as a means to cope
with an increasingly crowded federal docket, and that greater
availability of magistrates would induce economically disadvantaged litigants, unable to afford the delay and cost of waiting for
adjudication by an article III judge, to consent to trial before a
magistrate. 31
The dissent strongly urged that this sort of freely and voluntarily given consent to magistrates' jurisdiction easily becomes
coerced. 32 The dissent noted that the majority and the Third
Circuit in Wharton- Thomas 33 both admit that pressure on parties to submit to magistrates' jurisdiction increases in direct proportion to the number of magistrates positions. 34 The majority
argued that the process can be reversed when the situation becomes intolerable. 35 The dissent disagreed and instead maintained that the Constitution should prevent this type of coercion
from ever occurring. 38
29. Kaufman, Chilling Judicial Independence, 88 YALE L.J. 681, 715 (1979); Wallace, Judicial Administration in a System of Independents: A Tribe With Only Chiefs,
1978 B.Y.V.L. REV. 39, 56; Chandler v. Judicial Council, 398 V.S. 74 (1970).
30. 725 F.2d at 553.
31. Id.
32.Id.
33. 721 F.2d at 930-31.
34. 725 F.2d at 554.
35. Id. at 556.
36. Circuit Judge Pregerson wrote a separate dissent to make one point. He noted
that although magistrates perform important judicial functions, the mantle of independence essential to article III decision making is withheld from them. To correct this situation, Judge Pregerson reasoned that "magistrates should be awarded Article III protections commensurate with the Article III work they now so commendably perform."
Judge Pregerson's simple solution to the issue before the Ninth Circuit in Pacemaker
was to make magistrates article III judges. Id. at 555.
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The Ninth Circuit held that the elements of control and the
parties' consent present in 28 U.S.C. §636(c) are sufficient to
overcome constitutional objections. In its conclusion, the Ninth
Circuit mentioned compelling policy reasons, in addition to the
elements of control and consent, which require finding the section constitutional. The reasons described were that article III
courts have an increasing volume of cases and the assignment of
certain matters to magistrates aids in the efficient administration of the judiciary. The court also reasoned that the legislature
and the judiciary act responsibly when they provide and explore
new, flexible methods of adjudication. Therefore, for both Constitutional and compelling policy reasons, the Ninth Circuit
found Section 636(c) of the Federal Magistrate constitutional.
The dissent very succinctly pointed out the flaws in the majority's reasoning. And while a comparison of the dissent to the
majority opinion may warrant the conclusion that the dissent
has the Constitution on its side, there is one item noticeably
missing from the dissent's reasoning. It offers no solution to the
very real problem of an extremely overburdened judiciary. The
majority therefore reached the only possible practical holding-that Section 636(c) of the Federal Magistrate Act of 1979 is
constitutional.

Tova Zef/*

• Golden Gate University School of Law, Class of 1985.
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SCHOOL DISTRICT'S RESTRAINT ON
PUBLIC COMMENT BY EMPLOYEES:
A FIRST AMENDMENT INFRINGEMENT

I.

INTRODUCTION

In Anderson v. Central Point School District No. 6/ the
Ninth Circuit held that a school district's "channels"2 policy infringed upon activity protected by the first amendment. S The
court rejected the school district's assertion that the Supreme
Court's decision in Connick v. Myers" required a reversal of the
lower court. Instead, the court distinguished Connick and found
the communication in question to be protected activity. II
Plaintiff, a teacher-coach employed by defendant school district, attended and spoke at an open meetingS conducted by the
Board of Education to discuss its athletic policies. Shortly thereafter, plaintiff sent a letter to members of the Board which proposed changes in the district's athletic program. The letter was
written in violation of the district's "channels rule" which required all employees to channel their remarks to the Board
through the superintendent.'
1. 746 F.2d 505 (9th Cir. 1984) (per curiam; the panel members were Goodwin, J.,
Schroeder, J.J., and Aguilar, D.J., sitting by designation.)
2. The district's "channels" policy required advance notice to the superintendent of
any direct message sent to school board members by teachers. Defendants sought to justify the policy as furthering significant governmental interests in conserving the time of
board members and permitting the administration the opportunity to comment on the
accuracy of communications sent to the board. Anderson v. Central Point School District
No.6, 554 F.Supp. 600, 608 (D. Or. 1982).
3. The amendment states in relevant part: "Congress shall make no law ... abridging the freedom of speech . . ." U.S. CONST. AMEND. I.
4. 461 U.S. 138 (1983). Connick was a civil rights action in which plaintiff contended
she was terminated from her job as an assistant district attorney because she exercised
her right to free speech. The Supreme Court disagreed, holding the discharge was not
offensive to the first amendment because the speech in question was not of public concern. [d. at 140.
5. 746 F.2d at 507.
6. Plaintiff spoke for the five minutes allotted to each speaker at the meeting. [d. at

506.

7. The lower court had held the "channels" policy was an impermissible prior restraint on the right to free speech. 554 F.Supp. at 608.

211
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The superintendent responded by admonishing plaintiff for
communicating directly with the Board and for his failure to
send the proposal through the proper channels. Moreover, plaintiff was informed that he would not be assigned another coaching job anywhere within the school district. 8
Alleging his suspension resulted from the direct communication with the Board, plaintiff filed suit against the school district
and the district's school superintendent under 18 U.S.C. § 1983. 9
Plaintiff claimed the communication was activity protected by
the first amendment and sought an injunction against application of the "channels" policy. He also sued for damages for
physical and emotional distress and injury to his reputation and
employability.lo After a jury trial and verdict for the plaintiff,
the lower court entered a permanent injunction prohibiting the
school district's application of the policy to matters of public
concern.ll Defendant then appealed to the Ninth Circuit.
II.

THE COURT'S ANALYSIS

The primary issue considered by the Ninth Circuit was
whether the lower court's decision was consistent with the Supreme Court's holding in Connick. 12 Initially, the court noted
that the lower court properly applied the test stated in Pickering v. Board of Education lS in balancing the interest of the parties. 14 The court pointed out that the parties in a pretrial motion
8. The suspension from coaching was rescinded at a later date. 746 F.2d at 506.
9. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1979), states in relevant part: "Every person who ... under
color of statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage ... subjects ... any citizen ...
to the deprivation of any rights ... secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable
to the party injured . . . for redress."
10. 746 F.2d at 506.
11.Id.
12.Id.
13. 391 U.S. 563 (1968). The Court in Pickering held the dismissal of a high school
teacher for open criticism of the Board of Education on a matter of public concern, was
impermissible under the first amendment. Id. at 574.
14. 746 F.2d at 506. The lower court noted that the guidelines set forth in Pickering
were relevant in balancing the interest of the parties, including: 1) whether maintenance
of discipline by immediate supervisors would be affected by plaintiff's criticism; 2)
whether plaintiff's employment relationship with the board was so personal and intimate
that public criticism would undermine that relationship; 3) whether the employment relationship demanded personal loyalty and confidence; 4) whether plaintiff deliberately
made false statements; and, 5) whether plaintiff's claims would impede his performance
as a teacher or hinder the actual operation of the school beyond their tendency to anger
the board. 554 F.Supp. at 606. The lower court also emphasized that the Pickering anal-
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had agreed that the letter addressed matters of public concern,
one of the factors considered under the Pickering analysis. III
Defendants argued the Connick decision was applicable because although it had been stipulated that parts of the letter
addressed matters of public concern, the letter contained details
which were not of interest to the public. The court, however, distinguished Connick as a situation in which the employee's communication addressed matters of personal interest, not matters
which were of concern to the public. IS
The Ninth Circuit noted that Connick reiterated an important principle set forth in Pickering. Where an issue is a matter
of legitimate public concern, free and open debate is vital to the
decision making process. 17 The court explained that Connick did
not justify finding the plaintiff's letter to be a communication
not protected by the first amendment because it contained details not of public interest. Instead, the court made it clear that
under Connick, the test of whether an employee's speech addressed a matter of public concern must be determined by the
content, form, and context of a given statement as revealed by
the whole record. IS Applying that standard, the court concluded
the subject matter of the letter was of public concern and did
not lose its status as a protected communication because it contained some details some details not of interest to the public. 19
The court then addressed the defendants' contention that
the injunction was overly broad in that it barred enforcement of
any policy which prohibited direct communication by teachers
with members of the Board of Education on matters of concern
to the public. 20 The court stated that the defendants' assertion
was without merit because no case law supports the proposition
that there may be matters of public concern to which a "chanysis considered that the operation of a school system is of general public concern, therefore those involved in its operation have the right to address pertinent issues. [d.
15. 746 F.2d at 507.
16. [d.
17. [d. The Supreme Court in Pickering went on to conclude that teachers should

be able to comment freely on issues which touch upon the operation of the school system. 391 U.S. at 572.
18. 746 F.2d at 507.
19. [d.
20. [d.
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nels" policy might apply.21 Additionally, the court emphasized
the injunction was within the limits of Connick and that the focus of the controversy was not the boundaries of the injunction,
but rather the actual prohibitions placed on plaintiff's right to
comment on matters of public concern. 22
Also without merit was defendants' contention that the action should be one for defamation rather than for violation of
plaintiff's civil rights under section 1983. 23 In rejecting this argument, the court observed that the damages claimed under the
statute U must be tailored to the protected interest. According to
the court, since the protected interest was plaintiff's first
amendment rights, the award for damages resulting from a violation of those rights was consistent with the statute. 211
III.

CONCLUSION

The Ninth Circuit's approach indicates that the free speech
rights of school teachers will not be abridged when they comment on matters of public concern. The court's application of
the Pickering test to weigh a teacher's first amendment interest
with those of the state in promoting efficient public service, also
affirms the viability of that test in the Ninth Circuit.
When there is a question as to whether a communication is
of public concern, the court's opinion suggests it will focus on
the subject matter of the statement. In the future, courts should
acknowledge, as the court did here, that statements of public
concern should not lose their protected status under the first
21. [d.
22. [d.
23. [d. at 508. The court also disposed of three other arguments raised by the defendants: 1) the challenge that the jury instructions were improper was rejected; 2) the contention that the superintendent was entitled to good faith immunity was held invalid in
light of Pickering; and, 3) the claim that award of attorney's fees was inappropriate was
accepted insofar as the court remanded that aspect of the case to correct any discrepancy
which might be apparent. [d.
24. See Busche v. Burke, 649 F.2d 509 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 897 (1981).
In Busche, the court held that in a Section 1983 action, plaintiff could receive damages
for mental and emotional distress by demonstrating that the injury was caused by the
infraction. 649 F.2d at 519 n. 13.
25. 746 F.2d at 508. See also, Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247 (1978).
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amendment simply because they contain some details not of interest to the public.

Samuel Santistevan*

• Golden Gate University School of Law, Class of 1986.
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ZONING AND THE SUPPRESSION OF FREE SPEECH

I.

INTRODUCTION

In Playtime Theaters, Inc. v. City of Renton/ a municipal
zoning ordinance restricted the location of adult motion picture
theaters. 2 The Ninth Circuit ruled that a substantial state interest to justify that ordinance could not be found where the City
had relied solely on the experiences of other towns and cities,3
and that the existence of predominately legitimate concerns behind the ordinance did not establish that the regulation was unrelated to the suppression of speech. 4
In April, 1981, the City of Renton, Washington passed a
zoning ordinance, which restricted the location of adult motion
picture theaters to only 520 acres of the area encompassed by
the City.o Most of those 520 acres, however, were unavailable. s
At the time the ordinance was passed, there were no adult
theaters located in Renton. 7 However, in January, 1982, Playtime Theaters acquired an existing movie theater in which it
wanted to use to exhibit adult motion pictures. S The theater was
1. 748 F.2d 527 (9th Cir. 1984) (per Fletcher, J.; the other panel members were Farris, J., and Jameson, J., sitting by designation).
2. Renton, Wash., Ordinance 3526 (April 1981). The ordinance prohibited the location of the theaters within 1000 feet of any residential zone or single or multiple family
dwelling, any church or other religious institution, and any public park or area zoned for
use as a public park. In addition, the ordinance prohibited any such theater from locating within one mile of any public or private school.
The ordinance was amended after initiation of the litigation. An elaborate statement
for the enactment of the ordinance was adopted, and the required distance from schools
was reduced from one mile to 1,000 feet.
3. 748 F.2d at 537.
4.Id.
5. Id. at 534.
6. Id. A substantial part of the area was occupied by a sewage disposal and treatment plant, a horseracing track, a business park suitable only for industrial use, a warehouse and manufacturing facilities, an oil tank farm, and a fully developed shopping
center.
7. Id. at 530.
8.Id.

216
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within the area where adult pictures were proscribed by the
ordinance.
Playtime filed an action in federal court seeking both a declaration that the ordinance was unconstitutional and a permanent injunction against its enforcement. Subsequently, the City
of Renton brought suit in state court seeking a declaratory judgment that the ordinance was constitutional on its face and as
applied to Playtime's proposed use. Renton moved to dismiss
Playtime's federal action on the ground that the federal court
should abstain in favor of the state action. The district court
denied the motion,9 and eight months later granted a preliminary injunction. 10
Subsequently, Playtime began exhibiting adult motion pictures at one of its theaters. The district court then vacated the
preliminary injunction l l and denied the permanent injunction,
finding that the ordinance furthered a substantial state interest,
was unrelated to the suppression of speech, and was no more
restrictive than necessary to further the state interest.12 Playtime appealed to the Ninth Circuit.
II.

THE COURT'S ANALYSIS

The Ninth Circuit first determined that abstention was not
mandated. lS The Court then examined whether the zoning ordi9.Id.
10. Id. at 532.
11.Id.
12.Id.
13. In Railroad Commission v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496 (1941), the Supreme Court
held that a federal court, when asked for an injunction, should avoid needless friction
with state policies which might result from tentative construction of state statutes and
premature adjudication on their constitutionality. Id. at 500.
The Ninth Circuit has devised three factors, all of which must be applicable, in
order to abstain under Pullman. They are: (1) the suit must touch a sensitive area of
social policy upon which the federal courts ought not to enter unless no alternative for
adjudication exists; (2) a definitive ruling on the state issue in question must be capable
of ending the controversy; and, (3) the possibly determinative issue of state law must be
doubtful. J-R Distributors, Inc. v. Eikenberry, 725 F.2d 482, 487-88 (9th Cir. 1984).
In Playtime Theaters, the Ninth Circuit found absention not necessary due to the
strong federal interest in first amendment cases. It noted that absention could result in
the suppression of free speech, but would not eliminate or materially alter the constitutional issues presented. 748 F.2d at 532.
In Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971), the Supreme Court held that federal courts
should not enjoin pending state criminal prosecutions except under extraordinary cir-
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nance was constitutional.
In United States v. O'Brien,14 the United States Supreme
Court held that in the regulation of non-speech a sufficiently important governmental interest can justify incidental limitations
on first amendment freedoms. 111 It determined that a government regulation is sufficiently justified if it is within the constitutional power of the Government; if it furthers an important or
substantial government interest; if the governmental interest is
unrelated to the suppression of free expression; and, if the incidental restriction on alleged first amendment freedoms is no
greater than is essential to the furtherance of that interest. 18
In considering the existence of a substantial state interest,
the Ninth Circuit found the record, as presented by Renton, to
be very thin.17 The ordinance itself contained only conclusory
statements,18 no record of the public hearing had been made,
and those who had attended it remembered little other than
that it had happened. 19 The Court pointed out that in other
cases, where similar ordinances had been held constitutional,
such ordinances were the product of either the "culmination of a
long period of study and discussion" or "reports and affidavits
cumstances, and that the possible unconstitutionality of a statute "on its face" does not
in itself justify an injunction against good faith attempts to enforce it. [d. at 41, 54.
The Ninth Circuit has refused to extend this rule generally to civil cases. Goldie's
Bookstore, Inc. v. Superior Court, 739 F.2d 466, 469 (9th Cir. 1984). Those civil cases to
which it has been extended have arisen in a criminal or quasi-criminal context. [d. at
469-70. The Ninth Circuit has devised a test for application of the Younger rule to a civil
suit: the civil suit must bear a similarity to criminal proceedings or otherise implicate
state interests vital to the operation of state government. Miofsky v. Superior Court, 703
F.2d 332 (9th Cir. 1983).
The Playtime Theaters court found that a civil case seeking only declaratory relief
does not have such characteristics, 748 F.2d at 533, and consequently, since Playtime
Theaters had not violated the ordinance prior to challenging it, the case was not subject
to a Younger abstention. [d.
14. 391 U.S. 366 (1968).
15. [d. at 376.
16. [d. at 377.
17. 748 F.2d at 536.
18. [d. An elaborate statement of reasons for the enactment of the ordinance was
contained in the amendment passed after the initiation of the litigation. The reasons
included statements such as that various areas in the City "should be free of adult entertainment land uses," that "the image of the City ... will be adversely affected by the
presence of adult entertainment land uses" and that "such land uses should be separated
from uses with characteristics different from itself." [d. at 530 n.3.
19. [d.
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from sociologists and urban planning experts."20
Renton had not studied the effects of adult theaters, nor
had it applied any such findings to the particular problems or
needs of Renton.21 The district court had found a substantial
state interest only by considering Renton's reliance on the experiences of other towns and cities. 22
The Ninth Circuit held that, although Renton could have
used the experience of other cities as part of the relevant evidence upon which to base its actions, such experiences simply
are not sufficient to sustain the city's burden of showing a significant governmental interest. 2s
Renton also had to show that its zoning decision was "motivated by a desire to further a compelling governmental interest
unrelated to the suppression of free expression," to satisfy the
O'Brien test.24 The record submitted to the Ninth Circuit, however, raised an inference that a motivating factor behind the ordinance was suppression of the content of the speech, rather
than mere regulation of the effects of the mode of that speech,
because many of the stated reasons for the ordinance were no
more than expressions of dislike for its content. 211 Because the
city had little empirical evidence demonstrating the alleged deleterious effect of adult theaters, it failed to rebut this inference. 28
The district court upheld the ordinance because it found
Renton's predominate concerns were legitimate. 27 However,
where there are mixed motives, as in this case, the court must
determine whether a motivating factor in the zoning decision
was to restrict the exercise of first amendment rights. 28 If so, the
zoning ordinance is impermissible. 29
20.Id.
21. Id. at 537.
22. Id. at 536.
23. Id. at 537.
24. Id. (citing Tovar v. Billmeyer, 721 F.2d 1260, 1266 (9th Cir. 1983».
25. 748 F.2d at 537.
26.Id.
27.Id.
28. Id. (quoting Tovar, 721 F.2d at 1266).
29. 721 F.2d at 1266.
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Renton failed to rebut the inference that a motivating factor behind the ordinance was suppression of the content of the
speech. Therefore, Renton failed to show that its regulation was
unrelated to the suppression of speech.30
Renton argued that even if it had effectively banned adult
theaters, the ordinance was constitutional because similar adult
theaters existed in nearby Seattle. 31 The Court pointed out,
however, that such an argument was rejected by the Supreme
Court in Schad v. Borough of Mount Ephraim,32 because the
liberty of expression in appropriate places may not be abridged
on the ground that it may be exercised in some other place. 33

III.

CONCLUSION

The zoning ordinance passed by Renton created a substantial restriction on speech. There remained virtually no location
where an adult motion picture theater could operate. Because of
the nature of the statements made by the City in its amended
ordinance, it is apparent that at least part of its motivation was
the elimination of such theaters from Renton solely because of a
dislike for the content of the pictures.
Although a municipality clearly has the power to make zoning decisions for the health and welfare of its citizens,34 such decisions may not subsume first amendment rights.3& Strict requirements for the restriction of free speech have been designed
by the Supreme Court for the protection of this constitutional
right, and the City of Renton failed to demonstrate that its actions were within these requirements. The Ninth Circuit recognized this failure, and correctly revers'ed the decision of the district court sustaining the ordinance.
Martis McAllister*

30. 748 F.2d at 537·38.
31. ld. at 538.
32. 452 U.S. 61 (1981).
33. 748 F.2d at 538 (citing Schad, 452 U.S. at 76·77).
34. 748 F.2d at 534. See also Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 32·33 (1954).
35. 748 F.2d at 534. See also Schad, 452 U.S. at 68.
• Golden Gate University School of Law, Class of 1986.
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NINTH CIRCUIT NARROWS THE SCOPE
OF SEX-BASED WAGE DISCRIMINATION
CLAIMS UNDER TITLE VII

I.

INTRODUCTION

In Spaulding v. University of Washington,l the Ninth Circuit rejected plaintiffs' claim charging the defendent with sexbased wage discrimination2 under 42 U.S.C. §1983,s the Equal
Pay Act 4 and Title VII to the Civil Rights Act of 1964.1
In March 1972, members of the school of nursing faculty
filed a petition with the University alleging sex-discrimination.e
The University subsequently responded with a salary increase,'
but the nursing faculty remained dissatisfied. 8 Subsequently,
plaintiffs applied for, and the United States Department of Justice issued, a right to sue letter to plaintiffs who ultimately filed
1. 740 F.2d 686 (9th Cir.) (per Wallace. J.; the other panel member was Schroeder.
J. concurring) cert. denied. _U.S._. 105 S. Ct. 511 (1984).
2. 740 F.2d at 691-92.
3. 42 U.S.C. §1983 (1982) states:
"Every person who...subjects. . .any citizen of the United States...to the deprivation
of any rights. privileges or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws. shall be
liable to the party injured in an action at law. suit in equity or other proper proceeding
for redress."
4. 29 U.S.C. §206(d)(1) (1982) states:
No employer...shall discriminate ... between employees on
the basis of sex by paying wages to employees. . .at a rate less
than the rate he pays wages to employees of the opposite
sex.. .for equal work...which requires equal skill. effort and
responsibility, and which are performed under similar working
conditions, except where such payment is made pursuant to (i)
a seniority system; (ii) a merit system; (iii) a system which
measures earnings by quantity or quality of production; or (iv)
a differential based on any other factor ...than sex.
5. In relevant part 42 U.S.C. §2000e-2(a) (1982) states:
"It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer-(1) to fail to refuse to
hire any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any individual with respect to
his compensation. . .of employment, because of such individual's...sex.... "
6. 740 F.2d at 692.
7.Id.
8.Id.

221
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suit. S
In August of 1977, the district court referred the case to a
federal magistrate. Io The magistrate sat as special master and
heard the merits of the case,l1 whereupon he stated that he
planned to dismiss the action. I2 While preparing his findings and
conclusions, the Ninth Circuit decided Gunther v. County of
Washington. IS After requesting memoranda from the parties on
the effect of Gunther on his ruling, the special master concluded
that Gunther did not alter the outcome of the case. As a result,
he recommended that the district court dismiss.14 After an appeal,III the district judge reviewed the magistrate's findings of
fact under the clearly erroneous standard and adopted them. IS
On appeal, plaintiffs alleged that the district court erred in
not reviewing the special master's findings de novo,17 that the
district court erred in holding that the nursing faculty had failed
to establish the substantially equal work requirement of the
Equal Pay Act,I8 and that the district court erred in holding that
the University had not violated Title VII of the Civil Rights Act
9. During the interim a group entitled the Woman's Salary Inequity Committee was
formed. It sent a letter to the Office for Civil Rights of the United States Department of
Health, Education, and Welfare and to the Washington State Human Rights Commission. The Committee then filed charges with the Equal Opportunity Commission and the
University's Human Rights Commission. Id. at 692-93.
10. The district judge sua sponte referred the case pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §2000e5(f)(5), FED. R. CIV. P. 53, and Local MAG. R. 21. Id. at 693.
11. Id. The order of reference expressly required the magistrate to hear the case on
the merits and to report recommended findings of fact, conclusions of law and disposition back to the district court. This procedure is pursuant to FED. R. CIV. P. 53(e). [d.
12. Under FED. R. CIV. P. 41(b) a magistrate may grant a defendant's motion for
involuntary dismissal. The magistrate had concluded that the nursing faculty had failed
to show that they performed substantially equal work compared to male faculty members in other departments and that the Equal Pay Act standard governed claims under
Title VII and section 1983. Id.
13. 623 F.2d 1303 (9th Cir. 1979) aff'd, 452 U.S. 161 (1981). The Ninth Circuit held
that a plaintiff who fails to show that she performs substantially equal work is not precluded from suing under Title VII for relief from intentionally discriminatory compensation practices unless such practices are authorized by one of the four Equal Pay Act
affirmative defenses. 623 F. 2d at 13lO-13.
14. 740 F.2d at 693.
15. Spaulding v. Univ. of Wash., 676 F. 2d 1232 (9th Cir. 1982). The court held that
the special master was required to file a transcript of the proceedings before him with
the district court. Id. at 1235.
16. 740 F.2d at 693.
17. Id. at 694.
18. Id. at 696.
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of 1964. 19
II.

THE COURT'S ANALYSIS.

After holding that Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 53(b) requires that a special master's findings of fact should be accepted
unless clearly erroneous,20 the Ninth Circuit turned to the merits
of plaintiffs' Equal Pay Act claim. 21 Plaintiffs argued that they
had performed substantially equal work. To meet their burden,
plaintiffs compared their jobs to those of male faculty members
of other schools in the university22 and used statistics. 2s
With regard to the Equal Pay Act, the Ninth Circuit stated
that it prohibits an employer from discriminating in wage payments on the basis of sex.24 To make out a prima facie case
under the Act the plaintiff bears the burden of establishing it
did not receive equal pay for substantially equal work. 21i If a
prima facie case is established, defendant may attempt to show
that the disparity is based on either a seniority system, a system
which measures earnings by quantity or quality of production, or
a factor other than sex. 2S Under the Act equal work is measured
by comparing jobs on the basis of skill, effort, responsibility and
similar working conditions. 27 Actual job performance and content, rather than job descriptions, are determinative. 2s
Plaintiffs contended that they performed substantially
19. [d. at 699.

20. [d. at 695-96. The court stated that it was Congress' intent in citing FED. R. CIV.
P. 53(b) in 42 U.S.C. §2000e-5(O(5) to require courts to adopt a special master's findings
of fact unless clearly erroneous. [d. at 695 (citing White v. General Services Administration, 652 F.2d 913 (9th Cir. 1981». Therefore, the court held that it should not undertake its own de novo review of the magistrate's findings. [d. at 696.
21. 740 F.2d at 696.
22. [d. The other schools included "health services, social work, architecture, urban
planning, environmental health, speech and hearing, rehabilitative medicine and pharmacy practice." [d.
23. [d. at 697. The statistics attempted to compare sixty-six individual faculty members from selected departments with members of the nursing faculty "based on degrees
held, experience and merit." [d.
24. 29 U.S.C. §206(d)(I).
25. 740 F. 2d at 696-97. See Hein v. Oregon College of Education, 718 F. 2d 910, 913
(9th Cir. 1983); Corning Glass Works v. Brennan, 417 U.S. 188 (1954).
26. 740 F.2d at 696-97.
27. [d. at 697.
28. [d. Each claim, therefore, must be determined on a case-by-case basis. [d.
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equal work to that performed by specified comparator29 faculty
members. Plaintiffs argued both jobs required "preparation and
teaching of courses, research and publication, committee work,
advising of students and community service. "30 The Ninth Circuit concluded that although the comparator faculty positions
were facially similar, the special master was correct in concluding that plaintiffs had now shown substantial equality between
jobs. sl The court stated that the University's departments
placed varying degrees of emphasis on skills and that nursing
historically had been considered a discipline distinct from the
comparators' professions. 32 The court found the statistical evidence plaintiffs used to show substantial work inadequate. 33 Because an adequate showing of substantially equal work was not
shown by plaintiffs, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district
court's dismissal of the Equal Pay Act claim. 34
In addressing the nurses Title VII claim, the Ninth Circuit
directed its inquiry to whether plaintiffs had established a
prima facie case. SII Under Title VII, a plaintiff has two theories
or models available in litigation. Under the disparate treatment
model, plaintiff must show proof of discriminatory actions taken
by an employer from which a discriminatory motive can be
inferred. 38
The court stated that under Gunther a Title VII cause of
29. A "comparator" is the legal term for a person or group used by plaintiffs who are
benefitting from the unequal pay scale.
30. 740 F. 2d at 697.
31. 1d. The district judge adopted that finding and the Ninth Circuit concluded it
was not clearly erroneous.
32. 1d. at 697-98.
33. 1d. at 698. With regard to the statistical evidence, the court stated: "It did not
adequately account for prior job experience, rank or multiple degrees, and, most important, it did not adequately evaluate the actual work performed by various faculty members." 1d. In a broader statement the court argued that "statistical evidence may demonstrate a pay disparity, but a difference in pay between jobs which women primarily hold
and jobs which men primarily hold does not state a prima facie Equal Pay Act case if
the jobs are not substantially equal." 1d. See Horner v. Mary Institute, 613 F. 2d 706,
715 (8th Cir. 1980).
34. 740 F.2d at 698-99.
35. 1d. at 699.
36. See International Brotherhood of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 335
n. 15 (1977); McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973). Again, each
case must be decided on its particular facts. 740 F. 2d at 700.
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action exists outside of the Equal Pay Act. 37 The Ninth Circuit
noted that it would not articulate the minimum factors necessary for a plaintiff to establish a Title VII cause of action concerning sex-based wage discrimination. 38 However, since plaintiffs were unable to show substantial equality between jobs, the
court held that disparity in wage compensation alone was insuf7
ficient to establish a prima facie case. 3S Under the court's analysis plaintiffs were then required to prove intent to discriminate
to make out a case of disparate treatment. 40
The nurses argued that the district court was clearly erroneous in not finding discriminatory intent based on the proffered
testimony, evidence of an alleged predisposition toward discriminatory conduct by various university officers and statistics. 41
The Ninth Circuit found that all of the evidence taken seperately, and in bulk, was insufficient to support an inference of an
illegally discriminatory motive on the part of the University.42
Therefore, the district court's finding was affirmed. 43
The Ninth Circuit then turned to plaintiffs' second Title
VII theory, disparate impact. 44 The court stated that the elements of this cause of action are the occurence of certain outwardly neutral employment practices, and a significant adverse
or disproportionate impact on persons of a particular sex by the
employer's facially neutral acts or policies. 4!! Under this model,
37. 740 F.2d at 699 (citing Gunther, 623 F. 2d at 1321. "[A] plaintiff is not pre·
cluded from establishing sex-based wage discrimination under some other theory [than
substantial equality] compatible with Title VII.").
38. 740 F.2d at 697.
39. Id. "We will not, therefore, infer intent merely from the existence of wage differences between jobs that are only similar. Gunther does not require this." Id.
40. Id. at 701. The nurses had argued for an interpretation of Gunther which the
court called the "comparability plus" test. Id. Under this test the court would require
"only some degree of job comparability plus some combination of factors including direct
and circumstantial evidence of discriminatory conduct and pay disparities." Id. The
court vehemently rejected this test and stated: "[S]uch an unwieldy test might allow
plaintiffs to bolster inadequate showing of comparability with a confusing potpourri of
plus factors, plunging courts into standard less supervision of employer/employee relations." Id.
41. Id.
42. Id. at 701-04.
43. Id. at 701.
44. Id. at 705. See Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431 (1971). The court
stated that Title VII protects people from "not only overt discrimination but also practices that are fair in form, but discriminatory in operation."
45. Id.
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plaintiffs are not required to prove a discriminatory motive,
however, they must prove the discriminatory impact at issue. 46
In evaluating the nurses' arguments, the court reasoned that
since there had been no showing of substantially equal work,
plaintiffs had only the comparable worth theory upon which to
rely.47 As a threshold inquiry, the Ninth Circuit asked whether
the disparate impact model should be available to plaintiffs who
"make a broad-ranging sex-based claim of wage discrimination
based on comparable worth. "48 Answering this difficult issue in
the negative, the court stated that such "an extension of Title
VII would plunge us into uncharted and treacherous areas."49
Therefore, the court held that the Title VII disparate impact
model does not encompass sex-based wage discrimination claims
between comparable jobs. IIO Since the nursing faculty was unable
to show a facially neutral policy which caused wage discrimination, their disparate impact arguments were rejected. III
46. [d. at 708. The court stated: "What matters is the substance of the employer's
acts and whether those neutral acts are a non-job-related pretext to shield an indvidious
judgment."
47. [d. The court summarized plaintiffs' case as follows: "[Tlhey have shown a disparate impact by showing a wage disparity between only comparable jobs and this disparate impact is caused by the facially neutral policy or practice of the University of setting wages according to market prices for jobs in the disciplines." [d. at 705. For an
excellent presentation of the comparable worth theory see Note, Equal Pay, Comparable
Work and Job Evaluation, 90 YALE L. J. 657 (1981); Blumrosen, Wage Discrimination,
Job Segregation and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 12 U. MICH. J. L. REF 399
(1979). The basic premise of comparable worth appears to be that the market does not
accurately compensate people for the value of their work because of pervasive discrimination based on job classifications traditionally held by women. Compare, Nelson, Opton
and Wilson, Wage Discrimination and the "Comparable Worth" Theory in Perspective,
13 U. MICH. J. L. REF 233 (1980) and Beller, The Economics of Enforcement of an Antidiscrimination Law: Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 21 J. L. AND ECON. 359
(1978).
48. 740 F.2d at 705.
49. [d. at 706.
50. [d. It is interesting to note that the court stated that Gunther being a disparate
treatment case was of no help in evaluating the nursing faculty's impact claim. [d. at
705. The court cited and discussed with approval other cases which had rejected comparable worth. See Lemons v. City and County of Denver, 620 F. 2d 228 (10th Cir.), cert.
denied, 449 U.S. 888 (1980); Christensen v. State of Iowa, 563 F. 2d 353 (8th Cir. 1977);
Power v. Barry County, 539 F. Supp. 721 (W.D. Mich. 1982). The Ninth Circuit stated:
"We agree... and join those courts in refusing to accept a construction of Title
VII...whenever employees of different sexes receive disparate compensation for work of
differing skills that may, subjectively, be of equal value to the employer, but does not
command an equal price in the labor market." 740 F.2d at 707.
51. [d. at 708-09. The nurses advanced four arguments each of which they claimed
would provide a foundation for their discriminatory impact claim. The first was that by
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CONCLUSION

The Spaulding decision is important because it may have
significant impact on future sex-based wage discrimination
cases. Although the court was unanimous in its decision, Judge
Schroeder, in a special concurrence, did not join the court in its
holding that comparable worth is not available to plaintiffs
under the Title VII disparate impact model. II2 Since plaintiffs
disclaimed having presented any comparable worth theory in
their brief,1I3 the court's holding may be criticized as premature.
However, the Ninth Circuit, by this opinion, continues to
lead in determining the contours of Title VII sex-discrimination
employment cases. By precluding plaintiffs from raising comparable worth arguments under the disparate impact model, the
court is setting a trend which other courts will probably follow. 1I4
Moreover, the Ninth Circuit may also be ready to limit the contours of comparable worth on the disparate treatment model. lIl1
Although it was unclear from Gunther how much leeway the
court would allow in Title VII cases,1I6 the court can now be seen
using the market to set wages, the University had violated Title VII. The court rejected
this argument and held that disparate impact analysis does not apply when competitive
market prices are paid. Plaintiffs advanced three other facially neutral policies, all of
which were rejected. Id. at 708-09.
52. Id. at 709-10. Judge Schroeder argued that the majority's analysis of this issue
"confusedly meshe[d) adverse impact with varying concepts of comparable worth." Id. at
710. Furthermore, it was argued that it was inappropriate for the court to "render any
definitive ruling on the validity of comparable worth as a tool in employment discrimination cases." Id. This is because plaintiff's had only tried to compare work, not worth. In
conclusion he stated, "the confusion is evident... [in) the majority opinion in which the
majority fails to define what it means by comparable worth." Id.
53. Id. at 710.
54. The Ninth Circuit approvingly cites Power v. Barry County, 539 F. Supp. 721
(w.n. Mich. 1982), where the district court held that although Title VII allows a cause of
action to be stated for jobs that are not equal or substantially equal of intentional discrimination is shown, evidence of comparable worth cannot be used under the disparate
impact model of Title VII. Id. at 726. The court stated that it "cannot and will not,
evaluate different jobs and determine their worth to an employer or to society and then,
on that basis alone, determine whether Title VII or the Equal Pay Act has been violated." Id. at 726-27.
55. The recently decided American Federation of State, County and Municipal Employees (AFSCME) v. State of Washington, 578 F. Supp. 846 (w.n. Wash. 1983) is currently being reviewed by the Ninth Circuit. The district court had ruled that the State of
Washington violated Title VII when, under its job classification system, predominately
female job categories were paid less than male job categories involving comparable skill,
accountability and working conditions. 33 F.E.P. 808 (w.n. Wash. 1983).
56. 740 F.2d at 700.
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as giving a clear direction in this area. It is evident from the
strong language of this opinion that the Ninth Circuit is unwilling to interfere in an employer's determination of wage compensation based on the competitive job market. Ii? This may be wise
because Title VII is concerned with assuring equal access to jobs
regardless of sex, to jobs and not with equalizing pay for different jobs. 1i8 In this light the Ninth Circuit's jurisprudence is
commendable.

Douglas M. Buchanan*

57. Scholars and courts have pointed out that a large variety of non-discriminatory
factors may be at work in creating or perpetrating the employment of women to only
certain job categories. These may include familial and peer expectations, desire for parttime work, or work with flexible hours, reluctance to pioneer in non-traditional jobs and
lack of information about higher paying jobs.
58. See supra note 5.
• Golden Gate University School of Law, Class of 1986.
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